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An indication of the fierce Western competition for the contract, which is to be awarded this year, is the coming visit of Austrian Vice Premier Bruno Pittnerman on behalf of the Voest steel firm, which is a nationalized industry. The Ferguson Co. has had a high-level representative visiting here regularly since September 1962.

The project at Galati, which is not far from the birthplace of President Gheorgiu-Dej, symbolize Rumania's efforts to attain economic growth and independence—efforts which Western observers consider have been largely successful thus far. In addition to the giant steel combine, Rumanians are currently at work, in many cases with Western assistance, on major aluminum, paper, fertilizer and chemical installations. Oil, timber and grain continue to earn the necessary foreign exchange.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, May 10, 1964]

PARLEY WITH UNITED STATES SEEN AS NEW STEP IN QUIET REVOLUTION IN RUMANIA

(By Murrey Marder)

The United States and Rumania will begin a groundbreaking round of talk here May 18 in the "quiet revolution" of growing independence among the Communist nations of Europe.

President Johnson yesterday announced the conference, with the State Department filing in some important details.

The President said in New York that the meeting was "another * * * effort to increase peaceful contact with the people of Eastern Europe * * * in pursuit of a lasting peace."

What the United States is embarking upon could have long-range impact upon East-West relations.

Unusually high-level delegations have been named on both sides.

W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, will lead the American negotiating team. Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, economic planning czar, is to head Rumania's delegation. He is vice chairman of Rumania's Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Planning Committee.

The United States will test the possibility of encouraging more Rumanian ties with the West and more independence of what used to be monolithic, Soviet-imposed policy in Eastern Europe.

This Nation encouraged the same trend in Yugoslavia after its break with the Soviet bloc in 1948, and in Poland, after its partial show of independence in 1956.

Rumania already has taken several steps toward the diversity and independence of policy among Communist nations that the United States wants to foster. The Soviet Union has been obliged to acknowledge the equality of Communist nations, while it too seeks more trade with the West.

Bucharest's leaders have used the opportunity of rivalry between the Soviet Union and Communist China to resist centralized Soviet block attempts to dictate Rumania's economic development.

Rumania adheres to the Soviets' peaceful coexistence line. But it also has tried to operate as a mediator in the Sino-Soviet rift, to enhance its own preference for Communist diversity. Rumania has set out to increase its trade and associations with the West for the same reason.

The Rumanians have curbed their general obeisance to Moscow, to escape the satellite stigma, by eliminating compulsory teaching of Russian in their schools, by changing street and theater names, and by similar acts.

Trade and other matters, meaning political matters, will be the subject of the exploratory United States-Rumanian talks, the State Department announced.

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Rumania are now at the level of legations headed by ministers, rather than embassies directed by ambassadors.

Trade between the two is almost insignificant, and there are many American legislative barriers against its expansion.

Rumania does not have most-favored-nation trade rights with the United States, as do Poland and Yugoslavia. It is possible, however, to lift some trade bars by administrative action and Presidential interpretations, and perhaps in the future by legislation.

U.S. exports to Rumania dropped from \$1.8 million in 1959 to about \$800,000 last year. U.S. imports fell from \$1.2 million to about \$600,000 in the same period. The United States exported such items as steel, machinery, antibiotics, coal, and agricultural products, and imported walnuts, molasses, and glassware.

The Rumanians are anxious to buy synthetic rubber production equipment and other supplies in this country.

Rumania has launched a billion-dollar steel complex that was a major blow to Soviet plans for East European economic integration. A Franco-British team is now at work on the huge installations, with American and other Western firms competing for shares in the project.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island yield?

Mr. PELL. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I did not understand the number of people who were incarcerated.

Mr. PELL. At least hundreds, perhaps thousands; and through my own relationship with the International Rescue Committee, I know that the conditions of those prisoners are deplorable.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Does the Senator from Rhode Island know whether they had a jury trial?

Mr. PELL. I believe they did not have a jury trial.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I thank the Senator.

THE ROAD TO ANOTHER DIENBIENPHU

During the delivery of Mr. McCLELLAN's speech,

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last Thursday, May 7, which was the 10th anniversary of the French disaster in southeast Asia—the defeat and loss of control at Dienbienphu—I placed an article in the RECORD written by Bernard B. Fall, which gave the history that led up to that tragic event.

I pointed out that if we were wise, we would profit by France's mistake and not fall into that tropical trap in which France succumbed. I warned that if we did not disengage ourselves from the undeclared war—a civil war—in which we are participating with a steady and increasing loss of American lives in South Vietnam—we would have another Dienbienphu.

It is a coincidence that my thought was echoed quickly by the distinguished columnist of the New York Times, C. L. Sulzberger, who, 2 days later, ran his column in the Saturday, May 9 New York Times, under the heading "The Road to Another Dienbienphu."

I ask unanimous consent that his col-

umn be printed at the conclusion of my remarks, as well as an article summarizing the present situation in Vietnam, entitled "The Tragedy of Vietnam: Where Do We Go From Here?" written by Helen B. Lamb, a longtime student of Asian political and economic problems.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from Alaska? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, as a further bit of background information on Helen B. Lamb, she received her Ph. D. from Radcliffe College in 1943, thereafter working as a research analyst for the Foreign Economic Administration on the U.S. Government guide program for the American occupation of Japan. Subsequently, she joined the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she did research on India. For the last 2 years she has been making an intensive study of Vietnam in preparation for a book on the present crisis there. She went to Paris in 1963 to interview Vietnamese political exiles in that city, summarizing her findings in an article that was published in the Nation entitled "The Paris Exiles," on August 10, 1963. Dr. Lamb has taught economics at Black Mountain, Bennington, and Sarah Lawrence Colleges, and I feel she is most eminently qualified to discuss the situation in Vietnam.

Mr. President, we not only have no business in the civil war in Vietnam, but we have been there for a decade and we are doing a poor job. The equipment we are sending is defective, and obsolete. Not only are American boys dying, and no boys of our SEATO allies are fighting and dying, but it also appears that some of our boys are dying needlessly—although I would say that any who die in that remote jungle civil war are dying needlessly. They should not be there at all.

Today, on the front page of the Washington Daily News, is published an article entitled "How Obsolete Planes Are Killing Our Pilots." This article is by Jim G. Lucas, a veteran, experienced Scripps-Howard staff writer, and it is written under the dateline of Soc Trang, South Vietnam, May 11.

The article reads:

The Communist Vietcong didn't kill Jerry Shank.

His plane did.

Nor did they kill Bob Brumet of 9211 Shelton Street, Bethesda.

His plane killed him.

Here we are, the most powerful nation on earth, boasting every day of our superiority in modern arms, and we send our young men out to fight a ruthless, determined foe with equipment long past its prime.

Jerry Shank and Robert N. Brumet died because they were ordered to fly planes that might better have been consigned to the scrap heap.

TRAINERS

They were T-28's. The "T" stands for "trainer," and that's all it was intended to be.

It was outmoded in 1953. It is practically the last two-seated propeller-driven craft in the Air Force's inventory.

Yet out here we've loaded this antiquated trainer's wings with 500-pound bombs and napalm so that if one is down long enough it's inevitable that its wings will drop off. The men who fly them know that.

Politically, of course, the T-28 has its points. No one, including the Reds, could seriously object to it.

By using it, we're respecting the armistice terms of the 1954 Geneva convention, in that we're not introducing new equipment into Vietnam.

BODY FOR PROOF

Also, we can put a Vietnamese in the rear seat, contending he's a student pilot.

Actually, few of them even speak English and instruction is nonexistent.

But if a T-28 crashes, there will be a Vietnamese body in the wreckage, and apparently that's important in this game of hide-and-seek we're playing here.

I'm glad I don't have it on my conscience. As for Jerry Shank and Bob Brumet—every time they put their planes into a dive they must have wondered if they would come out.

On April 9, Capt. Robert Brumet, 36, put his craft into a dive and it didn't come out. His buddies, flying nearby saw the wings fall off and watched in horror as the plane plowed into the paddies.

They called over their radios for the choppers to come in and pick up what was left. The choppers didn't get there soon enough. The Vietcong got there first.

TORTURE

I hope Bob was dead when they found him, because these are the same people who ceremoniously broke the arms and legs of a district leader's wife at Kien Long recently and then killed her. That is the kind of enemy we face.

We need equipment we can count on to keep us out of their hands.

Captain Brumet was full of love of living and as fine a fighter pilot and a man as you could want.

On March 24, Jerry Shank put his ship into a dive between Soc Trang and Back Lieu and its wing separated from the fuselage.

Jerry was Capt. Edwin G. Shank, 27, from Winamac, Ind. When they shipped his body back, every shop and office in his home town closed for the day.

Jerry was liked by everybody, and most everybody felt the same way about him. He left a wife and four children.

MATS PILOT

Before he came to Vietnam, he was a MATS transport pilot. He graduated from Notre Dame in 1959 with a degree in architectural engineering.

He did his stint in the Air Force Reserve, liked it and decided to make flying his career.

Jerry had one consuming ambition: He dreamed of being the first American to land on the moon. Maybe he could have done it. He had all the qualifications.

It makes you wonder what kind of official thinking justifies taking the lives of two such young men—and there have been at least two others—and you make up your mind you will find out when you get home.

Such decisions may be easy to come by in Washington, where men are statistics and casualty rates are a wavering line on a weekly chart.

But they are harder to take when you know the brave men who honestly fear their planes—because they can not trust the craft to do the job they are asked to do in their country's name.

REPLACEMENT

The Pentagon says it is replacing the T-28 with a Navy carrier plane, the AD-6,

more adaptable to dive bombing. And that is good. But why wait until now?

Moreover, the Pentagon did not say when this would be done. And every day brave fighting men take off from Soc Trang in their T-28's, hoping the wings will stay glued until those new jobs get here.

One of the things which Jim Lucas did not tell relates to the utter hypocrisy which sends these men into combat when they are supposed to be there as advisers. That is the official version. Eighteen thousand Americans are there. They are on the firing line. I wish that Mr. McNamara, who has accepted the title which the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] bestowed upon the war, when he said he was glad to have it called McNamara's war, would explain why, after he has been in charge of the war for 4 years, our men are not better equipped and why they are sent to their death in obsolete planes that come apart in the air.

I also have an editorial, published in today's Washington News, based on the article which Jim Lucas wrote. The editorial reads as follows:

BRAVE MEN BETRAYED

Air Force Capt. Jerry Shank is one of 131 American fighting men who have lost their lives in combat since the United States began its program of massive assistance to South Vietnam in December 1961. In common with the rest of these brave men, Jerry Shank left a legacy of heartbreak, of a widow's empty, endless loneliness, of little children for whom a smiling photograph must forever be the inadequate substitute for a father's strong arms and loving counsel.

But Jerry Shank left something more than that. He was an articulate, angry man, and he left behind a poignant recital of how courageous young Americans are being betrayed by ancient equipment that is no longer equal to the demands of modern aerial combat.

Jim G. Lucas, a combat correspondent who has shared danger and despair with American troops in three wars, tells Captain Shank's story that no reader will soon forget. He tells it, we think, with cold indignation that is wholly justified. Letters written to his wife by Captain Shank have been published in Life magazine and in U.S. News & World Report. With Jim's story, written from the Soc Trang airstrip in the steaming, guerrilla-infested Mekong Delta, they give a shocking account of American men whose courage and devotion is being made a grisly mockery by obsolescent equipment.

Captain Shank died in a T-28, an aging, propeller-driven trainer that was never designed for combat. Loaded with 5,000-pound bombs and napalm tanks, it cannot indefinitely endure the stresses of repeated dive-bombing runs. Eventually the wings come off. That happened to Captain Shank's airplane on March 24. On April 9 it happened to the T-28 piloted by Capt. Robert Brumett.

Nor is the T-28 the whole story of courageous young American pilots being betrayed by war-weary, obsolescent aircraft. The B-26, a World War II attack bomber, was outmoded on V-J Day. Until recently it was flying combat sorties in Vietnam and, as Jerry Shank's letters have made brutally explicit, still killing American men. The H-21 (Flying Banana) helicopter has done yeoman duty in Vietnam, but it is old and slow and is by no means the Nation's best combat-lift chopper. It, too, imposes unnecessary risks on the men who fly it.

Attempts to obtain an explanation of why we are asking our men to fight with inferior equipment have elicited no coherent reply.

Some sources habitually insist the T-28 is ideal for anti-guerrilla warfare because it is slower than modern aircraft. But no one would suggest that its habit of shedding wings fits it for anything other than a flying coffin.

Captain Shank and Captain Brumett are a symbol of much that is wrong with our war in southeast Asia. The prevailing opinion of the men who are fighting it is that we are losing. Jim Lucas' sorrowing account of young Americans dying in the flaming wreckage of obsolete airplanes gives a tragic insight into one of the reasons we are losing.

Our men deserve better of those of us who remain safe back home.

Mr. President, I repeat my view, which I have stated before, that all of Vietnam is not worth the life of one American boy. It is not our war. We cannot win it. We should never have gotten in. We should never have stayed in. We should get out now on the best terms possible. But get out we should. Not another American boy's life should be sacrificed.

EXHIBIT 1

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE ROAD TO ANOTHER DIENBIENPHU

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

LONDON.—The extraordinary thing about Indochina in the decade since a fine French Army surrendered at Dienbienphu is that while the desperate game remains the same, the principal players have all switched positions.

France's empire received its deathblow in the battle and was subsequently extruded from Asia and Africa. The collapse of French military power in Vietnam produced a vacuum into which the United States moved.

After long hesitation Washington accepted the old Anglo-French idea of a regional alliance which became SEATO, whose only real strength was the nuclear-armed U.S. Pacific force. SEATO proclaimed unilateral protection of Indochina except for North Vietnam, which was abandoned to the victorious Communists.

Substitution of one Western power for another created temporary stalemate. Nevertheless, after consolidating its position in North Vietnam, communism resumed the initiative with guerrilla incursions into South Vietnam and Laos.

The United States—acting virtually alone despite SEATO—inherited the French role of damming the Communist tide. And France, more dynamic and independent-minded under De Gaulle—inherited our own role of omniscient critic and Western champion of "anticolonialism." Western positions were thus curiously reversed.

Starting with an advisory mission similar to that successfully employed against Communist guerrillas in Greece, we assumed an increasingly direct military burden in South Vietnam. We sought to assist this with diplomatic action designed to neutralize Laos and block the Communist supply line from north to south; but this effort failed.

Meanwhile, there has been a coincidental switch in Communist positions. At the time of Dienbienphu, although Ho Chi Minh's logistical support came from China, the political direction was Russia's. Moscow has now lost control. The southeast Asian Communist operation is today manipulated by Peking.

PRESTIGE COMMITTED

We have fewer men but just as much prestige committed in Vietnam as France had in 1954. And our allies are of little more use than were France's. In 1954 Britain was preoccupied with a Malayan insurrection and, until too late, the United States feared to intervene. Now France sits carping on the sidelines and Britain is again preoccupied, this time with Indonesia.

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Our political aims differ profoundly, but we seem to have learned little from France's military experience. Like the French we have unsuccessfully sought to seal off guerrilla supply sources. Like the French we have proved unable to capture the allegiance of the Vietnamese people. The pace of fighting intensifies and we seem immutably to be heading toward disaster.

A decade ago we were telling the French that colonialism was doomed and could not be saved by military action. The French are now telling us that military action cannot prevent defeat of our Vietnamese clients, that neutralism is the only way out.

Clearly, to avoid an ultimate defeat that would tarnish our prestige and weaken our Asian influence, we must change our strategy.

So long as we permit the Communists to fight according to their own rules, to train and equip guerrillas in a northern safe haven and then send them south, we cannot crush them. Our only hope of military triumph and positive political settlement would be to destroy their aggressive bases. We should never contemplate invading North Vietnam. But it is time to announce that, if aggression is not stopped, we will pulverize its bases and communications.

Counter guerrilla action must be moved into the third dimension—an aerial riposte. The time for showdown has come. We certainly don't want holocaust any more than we wanted holocaust in Cuba 18 months ago. But we cannot afford a self-defeating strategy.

The kind of peace that would be purchased by South Vietnam's neutralization would be a humiliating sham. Nevertheless, if such is preferable to the risk of major conflict, we should face that disagreeable truth. Otherwise we must adjust to obvious realities. There is no point pretending that a continued policy of neither war nor peace can lead to anything but an ultimate political repetition of Dienbienphu.

THE TRAGEDY OF VIETNAM: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

(By Helen B. Lamb)

President Lyndon B. Johnson in a speech to a labor conference in Washington, D.C., on March 23, 1964:

"The people of the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to ready attack. And that is why we must follow the Prophet Isaiah many, many times before we send the Marines, and say, 'Come now and let us reason together.'"

"And this is our objective—the quest for peace and not the quarrels of war. * * *

"In every trouble spot in the world this hope for reasoned agreement instead of rash retaliation can bear fruit."

Why are Americans fighting and dying in faraway Vietnam? Are we anxious to protect American investments there? Does South Vietnam have strategic raw materials which our Government thinks we need? Is the country within the perimeter of U.S. defense and security? The answer to all these questions is "No." Then why have we poured first billions of dollars and now 18,000 American troops into South Vietnam?

The official U.S. position, as expressed repeatedly by President Johnson, Dean Rusk, and others, has been that we are there because we want to "help" South Vietnam, we want to preserve "freedom" in South Vietnam, stop "aggression" against South Vietnam, and that our troops were "invited" to come to South Vietnam as "advisers" by the duly recognized Government of South Vietnam.

These reassuring bromides emphasizing our noble intentions cannot conceal certain stubborn facts. We are taking sides in a strictly Vietnamese civil war. We are the only foreigners directly engaged in this war. The

South Vietnamese Government which we are so eager to protect is virtually our own creation, as Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, has recently pointed out. The Government of Ngo Dinh Diem which "invited" our military forces into South Vietnam was thoroughly exposed to the entire world as one which did not represent the will of the South Vietnamese people, but the power-grabbing proclivities of Diem's own family clan. Since the execution of Diem by his own officers, rival military factions have fought for power—that is, for American largesse, which keeps the generals in power and the war going.

American public opinion is beginning to question the huge outlays of funds and the sacrifice of American boys for the sake of propping up unpopular "strongmen" who cannot defend themselves from their own people and so cling desperately to us. Senator ERNEST GRUENING, Democrat, of Alaska, addressed the Senate on March 10, concerning U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam, and concluded: "This is a fight that is not our fight into which we should not have gotten in the first place. The time to get out is now before the further loss of American lives." Senators ALLEN J. ELLENDER, Democrat, of Louisiana, and MORSE have expressed substantial agreement with him. Others, including Senator E. L. BARTLETT, Democrat, of Alaska, and Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD, have urged that we welcome President de Gaulle's effort to bring about a negotiated settlement.

HOW THE WAR STARTED

How did this endless Vietnamese civil war start? The successive beleaguered governments of South Vietnam have been challenged by the revolutionary forces of Vietnamese nationalism. These forces are intent on the overthrow of any and all right-wing governments which are tied to America's apron strings. We call the guerrilla fighters Communists (Vietcong). Actually, the overwhelming majority of these revolutionary fighters are not Communists and the program they are fighting for is not a program to establish a Communist regime.

Originally, back in 1945, when the war started, it was not a civil war but a revolutionary war of liberation from French colonialism. The Vietnamese were led by the great revolutionary, Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam's leading Nationalist and Communist. He organized the Viet Minh, a coalition of different Vietnamese political parties and interests commanding widespread support among the Vietnamese, conservatives as well as radicals. Even the Vietnamese Catholic hierarchy in North Vietnam supported Ho's revolution.

From 1947 on, the United States tried to convert this struggle for independence from French rule into an ideological war between rival rightwing and leftwing Vietnamese factions. To do this, the United States evolved a double strategy. We tried simultaneously both to help the French defeat the revolutionary Viet Minh and to force the French to grant formal independence to a conservative Vietnamese faction. This faction was built around the reinstated Vietnamese Emperor, Bao Dai, who had obligingly served as puppet head of Vietnam under the French colonial regime, as well as under the Japanese occupation during World War II, but had abdicated in favor of the revolutionary Viet Minh in 1945. Our double strategy was bound to fail because it was contradictory. The more we helped the French against the Viet Minh the less likely were the French to relinquish their hold on Vietnam.

VIETNAM'S GEORGE WASHINGTON

In the end, the French were forced out of Vietnam but not by our preachments. They were defeated by the Viet Minh at Dienbien-

phu because the Vietnamese people agreed with the Viet Minh that the war was a war of national liberation from French domination. And they did not believe the United States-French-Bao Dai claims that France would give Vietnam true independence or that Bao Dai was a genuine Vietnamese patriot to whom all Vietnamese should rally. Instead of turning against Uncle Ho, as Ho Chi Minh is affectionately called, very many Vietnamese loved and revered him as their great national hero, fought for him, worked for him, and carried on their backs the supplies for his army. He is the Vietnamese George Washington. To the end, Bao Dai was regarded as a French puppet and whatever concessions were grudgingly made to his government by the French were attributed not to the magnanimity of the French but to the strength of the Viet Minh.

Following several years of struggle with no outside assistance Ho Chi Minh finally, after 1949, got some help from Communist China, but it was a tiny trickle compared to the avalanche of aid that the French and Bao Dai got from the United States. The United States poured over a billion dollars worth of military aid and defense support into the war at that time, thus making the French-Bao Dai army infinitely better equipped than Ho Chi Minh's peasant troops. This American aid merely prolonged the agony and greatly added to the casualty lists for both France and Vietnam. It did not alter the outcome.

As the war dragged on, the French became weary and reluctant to continue the fighting. They were alienated by what some Frenchmen suspected were America's efforts to displace them in Indochina. The French press questioned why French lives should be lost in America's anti-Communist crusade. To keep the war going, the United States offered a greatly expanded military aid program. But the French will for peace prevailed and a peace conference was finally scheduled in the spring of 1954 at Geneva, attended by all the great powers, even intermittently by the United States, though the Eisenhower administration hoped it would fail.

HO MAKES CONCESSIONS

It did not fail. Ho Chi Minh, a past master at negotiation and compromise, made significant concessions in order to achieve a settlement. These concessions were the provisional partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, an important facesaving device for the French as it allowed them to regroup their troops temporarily in South Vietnam rather than surrender to the Viet Minh. No Vietnamese wanted this partition. Even the Bao Dai delegation was against it. Two reasons impelled Ho Chi Minh to make this concession. First, the United States was threatening to expand the war and had offered France the use of the atomic bomb. And second, the partition itself was supposed to be temporary.

The Geneva accords stipulated that within 2 years French troops had to withdraw from South Vietnam; and that the provisional governments of the two zones, the north under Ho and the south under Bao Dai and his Prime Minister, Diem, had to give way to a new all-Vietnamese Government, freely chosen in a nationwide election supervised by the International Control Commission set up to police the agreements. The United States alone among the great powers refused to endorse the Geneva accords, though we did at that time go on record as opposing the overthrow of these agreements by force.

WHAT PARTITION MEANS

After Geneva, it soon became apparent that the United States planned to subvert the Geneva accords by subtle, indirect means such as the formation of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), and to continue the struggle under a different

gulse. We refused to accept the verdict of history. Our side, the French-Bao Dai team, had lost. But we did not let them settle down peacefully to carry out the agreements.

How would we Americans have felt if at the end of our own Civil War between the States, a foreign power had said to the defeated southern leaders, "We will support you; we will help you get ready to fight again; you can ignore the peace terms and we will back you up. With our help you can get your secession after all; the South should be a separate country because its institutions and ideology are fundamentally opposed to those of the North." This is precisely what we have done in South Vietnam.

This American policy of insisting that Vietnam be permanently cut in two at the 17th Parallel with no intercourse, not even trade, between the anti-Communist south and the Communist north, outrages Vietnamese patriotism because it violates the integrity of Vietnam and threatens its very survival as an independent state. Instead of one strong country it creates two weak ones, neither of which is viable. North Vietnam needs the surplus rice from the south, and South Vietnam needs coal and industrial raw materials from the north. Thus the total divorce of North and South Vietnam has forced each half to turn elsewhere for trade and aid, North Vietnam to the Communist bloc and South Vietnam to the United States.

This precarious dependence on great powers, which belong to different power blocs, and are locked in conflict with each other, fills thoughtful Vietnamese, whatever their politics, with great anxiety for the future of their nation. Vietnam is a small country at best and suffered in the past a thousand years of Chinese domination. The Vietnamese expelled the Chinese in A.D. 939 and maintained their independence except for short interludes until the French conquest beginning in 1858 and ending in 1954 with the country's partition. This division, so fraught with danger for the Vietnamese people, is like a time bomb.

WHAT PRICE CONFRONTATION?

The American policy of maintaining tension in this area through a hostile confrontation between North and South Vietnam has created in South Vietnam a country which cannot possibly stand on its own feet. South Vietnam has a smaller population than North Vietnam. The role the United States assigned to South Vietnam was that of virtually declaring war on North Vietnam. South Vietnam cut off all trade and normal relations between the two zones, making it necessary to build a military establishment way beyond the capacity of South Vietnam's own slender resources. South Vietnam has thus become chronically dependent on the United States. In consequence, the leaders of South Vietnam, from Ngo Dinh Diem on, have had to bear a double cross, the cross of being called American puppets and the cross of being held responsible for the continued partition of their country.

In addition to everything else that is wrong with a policy that insists on creating a sanitized anti-Communist bastion of the free world out of South Vietnam, this policy of the United States made civil war in the south inevitable. Why? Because it involved a vigorous effort to root out all pro-Ho Chi Minh sentiment in the south where he had and still has much support. In fact, before 1954 large areas of the south had been governed by the Vietminh, which had already put through agrarian land reforms. Diem's government tried to turn the clock back. With Diem's army, sent into the countryside to purge all those who had helped the Vietminh or benefited from Vietminh reforms, marched the landlords demanding back rents. There were protest demonstrations and brutal police repression until finally many in

the rural areas, including members of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects, fled to the jungles to organize an armed resistance.

A GRASSROOTS WAR

This current revolution was made in South Vietnam.

Both sides use terror in this dirty war, but the Government side has more terrible means for the mass extermination of people, livestock, and crops. It has used poison chemicals, napalm bombs, and long-range artillery supplied by the United States. Powered by American planes, death and destruction rain from the sky on a village's entire civilian population—on guerrilla fighters and passive bystanders, the rich as well as the poor peasants, the Catholics and the Buddhists, women, children, and old men. These tactics suggest that the Government gave up long ago any hope of winning the people to its side.

WHAT IS LIBERATION FRONT?

By the crucial year 1960 the Diem tyranny was under attack from all sides. A group of 18 prominent South Vietnamese intellectual and political figures issued a manifesto April 26 criticizing the Government for its total failure to bring freedom, justice, democracy, and prosperity to South Vietnam. Even the military were disaffected. On November 11 a coup d'état, staged by dissident army officers, was suppressed by General Nguyen Khanh, the present dictator. The failure of these efforts to bring about changes in the Government and the repression which followed led more and more Vietnamese to join the guerrillas, either from dislike of the Diem regime or fear for their personal safety. On December 20, 1960, the guerrillas organized the National Liberation Front to coordinate the fighting against the Diem regime and to get some consensus on possible peace terms.

Like the former Vietminh, the Front is a coalition of many groups—religious, ethnic, and political—with several political parties, of which the Communist Party of South Vietnam plays an outstanding role. The main support for the Front comes from those South Vietnamese who have suffered most under the Diem rule—the poor peasants, certain Buddhist sects, the Cambodian minority, and the ethnic tribes who live in the high plateaus. The Front's program reflects the needs and wishes of its present members as well as their desire to get more adherents. This means it is the typical program, not of a class war, but of a liberation movement against the tyranny of the overbearing South Vietnamese Government and its foreign sponsors. Therefore it has something for everyone and postpones really difficult controversial issues until freedom has been won.

At the head of the Front is Nguyen Huu Tho, a noted civil liberties lawyer, who during French rule had defended Vietnamese patriots arraigned before the courts of Saigon for their political activities on behalf of Vietnam's freedom. In 1950 he organized demonstrations against American arms shipments to Saigon, for which he was jailed by the French. After 1954, he became vice president of the Peace Movement of Saigon-Cholon, working for the full implementation of the Geneva Accords. Considered subversive by the Diem government, he was arrested in September 1954, and held without trial until the guerrillas freed him in 1961. With no political affiliation himself, he heads the Front's committee of leaders from different political parties, religious sects and ethnic minority groups as well as representatives for different sectors of the population—students, women, peasants, and so on.

WHY THE FRONT HAS GROWN

The Front has grown in a short time into a large organization, estimated to contain some 300,000 full- and part-time fighters and

from 4 to 5 million supporters, according to Associated Press Correspondent Malcolm Browne (Providence Journal, Feb. 9, 1964).

The Vietnamese people are attracted to the Front's program and propaganda. The Front makes peace proposals instead of war proposals. It advocates neutralism as a means of stopping the war and insuring Vietnam's independence. It demands that normal trade relations be resumed between North and South Vietnam and that ultimately negotiations take place between the two areas looking toward the reunification of Vietnam. It outlines a postwar program of economic development and social and political reform. It calls for a great extension of freedom by the removal of all restrictions which have been imposed by the South Vietnamese Governments since 1954 on groups, local communities and individuals. Let us analyze the content of Front propaganda and compare it with the South Vietnamese Government's own propaganda line.

The most effective propaganda is of course the propaganda of deed and example. What is the tone of life in Saigon, controlled by the Government, and in the countryside that is controlled by the Front? In Saigon there are increasing extremes of wealth and poverty; new building is mostly luxury apartments. There are many signs of high life and Western influence—gambling and prostitution; and the twist, American jazz, American movies and American soldiers with a lot of money to spend. Everywhere there is evidence that the South Vietnamese Government depends heavily on the United States—\$3 billion worth of American aid since 1954, mostly in the form of imported goods and weapons. Corruption and graft have become matters of common knowledge. According to the reports in the American press, the Saigonese appear to be either cynical or indifferent as to the succession of military coups.

Out in the rural areas where the Front is strong, equality is the keynote; all are poor. There is no corruption and no luxury. Life is difficult, austere, and rigorous. People work hard and become fanatically dedicated to the cause of the Front. Instead of being dependent on handouts from abroad, they are very self-reliant and even improvise primitive weapons of their own. There are no foreigners in their midst. In consequence, their movement is an all-South Vietnamese movement and their cause that of patriotically ridding their country of all foreign—that is, American—interference.

WHAT ABOUT NORTH VIETNAM?

American commentators assert repeatedly that North Vietnamese troops have committed aggression by invading the south. If this were so, it would not be a matter of foreign aggression, as North Vietnamese are still Vietnamese. But is it so? New York Times Reporter David Halberstam reported on March 6, 1964, "No capture of North Vietnamese in the south has come to light."

To be sure, former Viet Minh soldiers are now fighting in South Vietnam, but they are South Vietnamese according to U.S. officials (New York Times, June 18, 1963). These are the Vietminh regulars who had to regroup in North Vietnam under the Geneva Agreements of 1954. They thought they would be returning to their families in the south in 1956 after the promised elections. When Diem and the United States blocked these elections, many of these South Vietnamese filtered homeward over the famous Ho Chi Minh trail through the jungle of Laos. The front does not need soldiers from North Vietnam. It is an insult to the South Vietnamese to imply that they do not make as dedicated, competent, and militant fighters as their northern compatriots—when they are on the side of Vietnamese freedom. As to their supply of weapons, the United States made an official breakdown

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of a cross section of weapons taken from the Vietcong and only 1 in 50 came from the Communist bloc, as reported in the Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1963, by its Far Eastern correspondent, Louis R. Rukeyser.

The whole rationale of guerrilla warfare presupposes that success depends on the support of the people, on raising local issues meaningful to the people, on local leaders and local self-reliance, with weapons either homemade or captured from the enemy. Peasants fight because they are defending their homes. So the front stations its recruits in their own locale, whereas the Government, fearing its soldiers may defect, stations them far away from their home base. The guerrillas destroy roads and bridges because these are the means of supplying the Government troops, not the guerrillas' own forces.

The guerrillas fighting courageously in South Vietnam against such great odds know, however, that they have the unqualified moral support of all the Socialist countries. Many student and peace organizations in non-Socialist countries, even including the United States, have passed resolutions condemning the war and proposing an international conference to bring about peace through compromise and negotiation. The members of the Front have naturally the greatest sense of solidarity with their North Vietnamese compatriots who have a very special interest in the victory of the Front. This victory would mean not only the end of American interference in South Vietnam, but also the resumption of normal trade relations between North and South Vietnam looking toward ultimate reunification of Vietnam. These goals mean as much to a North Vietnamese as to a South Vietnamese. But the concrete aid that the North has provided for the struggle in the South seems to be slight, aside from educational and training facilities accorded South Vietnamese who manage to get to the North.

COUP FOLLOWS COUP

While the Front has grown stronger since 1960, the Government of South Vietnam has grown weaker, and its dependence on the United States has consequently increased. The attempted coups d'état in 1960 and 1962 failed, but were followed by others in 1963 and 1964 which were successful. These self-appointed military cliques kill or jail their predecessors, so that the only real thread of continuity in South Vietnam today is the American presence and American power, to effect American policies. Each clique clutches for our favor and announces that it wholeheartedly supports the American position. As long as the United States continues to pour men and money into South Vietnam, there will always be some Vietnamese who, with hands outstretched for more aid, will parrot the U.S. line on the war.

The relationship of all these governments to the United States has been basically that of a parasite to its host—with certain surface differences in the relationship being registered from one regime to the next. Diem and his brother Nhu wanted American money but not American advice. Diem was an obstinate, proud man, absolutely sure he knew what was best for Vietnam, and so inevitably collided with American advisers who were equally sure that only they knew what was best for Vietnam. Diem and especially his smart brother Nhu became increasingly exasperated with American interference in how to win the war against the guerrillas, how to run the government, and how to handle the Buddhist crisis. Their growing hostility to America tended to veil the government's dependence on the United States and thus took some of the curse off the Front's charge that Diem was nothing but an American puppet. Friction mounted with the continued failure

of the joint United States-Diem effort to destroy the guerrillas.

Finally, in the summer of 1963, the United States decided that the Diem regime had to go. We called for a "change in personnel"—just as if South Vietnam were the Ford Motor Co. and we its leading stockholders. Then by quietly discontinuing the commercial aid program, ultimate source of the military budget, we stirred the generals to act. We sloughed off Diem because he was not sufficiently puppetlike. With this "lesson" before them, the successors to Diem are not likely to get out of line.

The United States has leaped to recognize each new government in turn, and American officials solemnly announce on each occasion that this government represents the will of the South Vietnamese people. When our protégé, Diem, was overthrown, the population of Saigon went wild with joy and showered the military junta with flowers and kisses. But this demonstration represented relief over the end of the Diem tyranny rather than support for the generals who succeeded it. Three months later when the junta was itself overthrown, no one, Vietnamese or American lifted a finger in its defense. For the new dictator, General Khanh, there were neither flowers nor kisses. The weary Saigonese merely asked, "General Khanh—who is he?" On the evening of his coup and the next day, General Khanh spent his time not in rallying the population to his leadership but, closeted with U.S. Ambassador Lodge, arranging for the continuation of American aid, which was quickly granted.

KHANH ACQUIRES A FORTUNE

Shortly thereafter, General Khanh boasted that he had \$10 million and could therefore flee the country and lead a life of ease if he wanted to (New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 3, 1964). So far, he has chosen to remain and becomes the hero of Life magazine, which quotes an American "adviser's" description of Khanh as follows: "He is a hell of a fighter. He is the kind of leader who goes out into the field with his men and kicks them in the rear." (Feb. 14, 1964.)

American officials and General Khanh are still in the honeymoon stage. We praise him to the skies and he reciprocates. He asks our advice and he follows it, even to dispensing candies to the kiddies. According to newspaper reports he admits that the anti-Communist cause has no chance of survival without the most wholehearted U.S. support, and says, "Unfortunately, he (Ambassador Lodge) is the No. 1 man in Saigon." (New York Times, Mar. 13, 1964.)

Whenever General Khanh travels into the countryside, he is flanked by American army men or diplomats. It looks as if we were trying desperately to sell Khanh as our man to the doubting Vietnamese public. How can American officials be so naive? As the London Times pointed out last September 3, "... anyone put into power by the Americans, or any other foreign power, would almost automatically forfeit any hope of gaining mass backing." The American embrace may well be the kiss of death for General Khanh in this sense.

Unquestionably the general is overdoing his puppetry. One wonders if he is not a veritable agent of the Front. For hasn't each new government clique accused its predecessor of working for neutralism and an accommodation with North Vietnam, i.e., of being a "traitor"? Perhaps the next dictator will so accuse General Khanh.

CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR WHOM?

Freedom is a great slogan used by both sides to rally people to their cause. Freedom from American intervention is the goal of the front; freedom from communism is the slogan of the government. In the realm of specific civil liberties both sides claim to stand for the basic freedoms: freedom of

speech, of religion, of assembly, of the press, and of political and trade union organization. The front has the advantage of being the party not in power in Saigon. Government spokesmen cannot obscure their own very bad record on individual and group liberties. None of these basic freedoms have been respected.

General Khanh and the junta before him inherited the whole Diem apparatus of tyranny and have not yet cleaned house. There are today some 28,000 political prisoners who are still in jail and who have never even been brought to trial. Under Diem the elections were rigged. Since Diem, there has been an out-and-out military dictatorship, with no elections in sight. General Khanh, the leader of the moment, brands all who disagree with him as either Communist or neutralist traitors. Even South Vietnam's top generals are held under house arrest, though no evidence has been presented against them.

General Khanh thus demonstrates a total disregard for due process of law in contrast to Nguyen Huu Tho, the head of the front, whose efforts on behalf of civil liberties are well known. General Khanh's "freedoms" tend to be of the never-never-land variety, since they wait on final victory and unconditional surrender, conditions which appear daily to be more remote. In the meantime, General Khanh advocates not more freedom but more repression, reviving Diem's secret police and the hated strategic hamlet program renamed "new rural life program."

GOVERNMENT BY THREAT

The people of South Vietnam have been uprooted from their homes, impressed into forced labor, the peasants herded into "strategic hamlets" long distances from their fields. Here they live under police surveillance and under constant fear of reprisals because of their relatives in the Front. More and more hamlets have gone over to the Front, which besides the abolition of these practices advocates a return to village autonomy. The Front wants to accede to the villagers' desire to elect their own officials instead of having an army of government civil servants foisted on the village from above.

The freedom that is denied to individuals likewise is withheld from private enterprise. True, business firms cannot be driven into concentration camps, but can be and are subject to blackmail, as they were under the other anti-Communist governments of South Vietnam. Import licenses have been cancelled because the importer's politics were distasteful to one or another dictator. Now the government has threatened to confiscate French investments in South Vietnam—banks, rubber plantations and a few industrial plants—unless these firms not only subscribe to the Saigon government's present politics, but also put pressure on De Gaulle to make France do likewise. (New York Times, Jan. 23, 26, 1964.)

In contrast to the government's threats to private investment and enterprise, the Front has offered protection to business interests, even foreign concerns, provided they play a productive role in the future economy of Vietnam. This is in line with its desire to obtain the broadest possible support, passive if not active, for its struggle against United States domination of South Vietnam. The rubber plantations have been forced to pay double taxes—to the Front in the countryside and to General Khanh's government in Saigon. No wonder business wants a peace settlement.

The propaganda of the various South Vietnamese governments, one suspects, has been pitched to win not the Vietnamese, but American audiences—and assistance. Each ruling clique tries to make the issue Western capitalist democracy versus communism. Both these concepts are abstractions which have very little meaning to the average Viet-

namese. The people, save for a few Western-educated intellectuals more at home in New York than in Vietnam's rural districts, have had no experience with Western political institutions. They have experienced, however, the South Vietnamese Government's curious amalgam of extolling freedom in theory but denying it in practice, and they are against it.

FREEDOM IN FACT

Let us take, for example, the Montagnards, tribesmen who live in the mountains of South Vietnam, and whose culture, language, and economy are entirely different from those of the lowland Vietnamese. They do not want rhetoric about the virtues of a two-party system. They want concrete safeguards for their distinctive way of life—and these the Front has promised. They want the right to dress as they please, wear long hair, live in the tribal long house instead of single family dwellings, use their own language in schools and courts, keep their old land-holding relationships and their inheritance of property laws. In all this they seek ethnic and cultural autonomy as it has already developed in North Vietnam where the government, unlike that of the South, allows cultural diversity. The North has retained some of the old safeguards which the French provided against the ruthless Vietnamization of these primitive people.

The one great positive freedom which the Vietnamese do understand and have fought to achieve is not individual freedom—this is a Western import—but group freedom, especially the freedom from foreign domination. In the Vietnamese struggle against French colonialism, the Communist, Ho Chi Minh, was the great national hero and leader. Therefore, people associate national fulfillment and freedom with Communist leadership. No comparable leader to Ho Chi Minh has emerged in South Vietnam—Diem saw to that. Ho is admired and honored by millions of Vietnamese, both in the North and in the South, whether they are or are not Communist.

In areas where subject peoples have had to fight to win independence from their colonial masters, a term in jail becomes a badge of patriotism and an essential ingredient of the claim to leadership in the country's future. Nguyen Huu Tho meets this specification. None of the leading figures of any of the governments of South Vietnam since 1954 can qualify in this respect. They all either worked as administrators for the French or fought in the French colonial army against their own compatriots.

U.S. OBJECTIVE: WHAT IS IT?

To the war-weary general public in Vietnam, peace is the paramount issue and the Front has captured it. The Front proposes an immediate cease-fire and a negotiated peace between contestants. The successive South Vietnamese governments, though unable to defeat the Front, have talked belligerently of fighting to the bitter end. Nothing less than total victory and unconditional surrender will do. The United States, which is the power behind General Khanh's shaky throne, has never proposed an over-all settlement. It is unclear for what goals we are urging the Vietnamese to fight so bitterly. As Stanley Karnow pointed out in the *Herald Tribune* (March 1, 1964), "What constitutes a satisfactory solution is something Washington will have to define just as it has yet to describe clearly its ultimate objective in Vietnam."

Why have we made no proposals for a settlement? Why is there no urgency to restore peace to this war-torn land, no suggestion of willingness to negotiate, no hint that we would be willing to make compromises if the other side did likewise? The United States is using South Vietnam as a guinea pig for trying out and testing under fire new weap-

ons, equipment and tactics with which to fight guerrilla uprisings everywhere. If the war ended we would cease to have our laboratory. Is this why there is no American urgency for peace?

Why are the Vietnamese generals so reluctant to formulate peace proposals? Generals everywhere are trained to make war, not to negotiate settlements; the latter is the diplomat's job. Peace has certain very real hazards for the Vietnamese military. The generals would have to relinquish their power to civilian authorities. General Khanh says he would like to do this but would he? The end of the war would bring a drastic cut in the military budget because American aid would cease or be much reduced and because a truly civilian government would want to use most of South Vietnam's meager resources for economic development. Peace would thus mean that the power, prestige, and pocketbook of the military clique would suffer. Is this why General Khanh offers mobilization for total war to the war-weary Vietnamese, and threatens to shoot or jail for life all those whom Khanh considers to be slackers? (New York Times, Mar. 19, 1964.)

FRONT URGES NEGOTIATIONS

In contrast to the government's reluctance to discuss peace, the Front has consistently advocated a negotiated settlement. Many Vietnamese welcome the Front's peace proposals, irrespective of their merits, simply because the people are so anxious to have peace. Actually, the proposals do have the great merit that they are based on a true estimate of the facts. The main reality in South Vietnam is that the war is a stalemate, with the power of people and numbers on one side, and the power of superior material on the other. In the present contest there is a striking parallel with the former war between the Vietminh and the French; today the Front controls most of the countryside at night, as the Vietminh did formerly, while by day the Saigon government controls the cities and the main roads, much as the French did. This stalemate is endless because if the United States tries to upset the balance by attacking North Vietnam, the war will be extended to a higher level of horror, since both sides can play the deadly game of escalation. The stalemate means that no one is going to win an unconditional surrender. If ever there is going to be peace, it can only come by a negotiated settlement in which both sides make compromises and adjustments.

The front has proposed as a compromise the setting up of a new coalition government composed of representatives of the existing Government, the Front, and other Vietnamese organizations. General elections would follow, the franchise to be universal. The idea of compromise is spelled out further in the middle-of-the-road character of the program for economic development. The front proposes that it be neither capitalist nor Communist, but a mixed economy which permits private enterprise and promotes agrarian reform and economic planning.

It is vital to end this war by compromise, either the front's or some other growing out of the peace negotiations which must come sooner or later. After a civil war, the soldiers do not retreat behind different national barriers; they have to settle down and live with one another in their own war-torn country. Compromise suggests self-respect and face saving for all. It is the very antithesis of the "arrogance of victory and the venom of defeat," to use E. M. Forster's phrase, which could poison the atmosphere for generations to come. Therefore the quality of the peace, as well as the possibility of peace, depends on a negotiated settlement.

NEUTRALISM IS FAVORED

Neutrality is tremendously popular in South Vietnam as the means for ending the

war and safeguarding the peace. The Front has proposed it as part of its overall compromise. As a neutral, South Vietnam would treat all countries alike—Communist as well as non-Communist. Neutrality means keeping all governments at arm's length, not allowing South Vietnam to be caught up in any nation's suffocating embrace. This would not preclude American aid or trade in moderation. It would preclude the stationing of troops by the United States, China, or any other foreign country on South Vietnamese soil. Neutrality would commit South Vietnam to independence and self-reliance. If South Vietnam's neutrality were guaranteed by the great powers, those powers would be committed to observe and honor this independence, and to check one another.

The desire for neutrality in South Vietnam is very strong and has existed for some time. It requires the withdrawal of American troops from the entire area. This is ardently desired even by some Vietnamese who are opposed to a formal commitment to neutrality by South Vietnam. They believe this American withdrawal would help to get the South Vietnamese Government—which ever general is in power at the moment—to the conference table. Ho Thong Minh, who runs the influential Paris journal, *Pour le Vietnam*, stresses this point particularly: that if only the Vietnamese are left alone, they can resolve their differences whether within South Vietnam or between North and South Vietnam. The American military presence stiffens the South Vietnamese Government clique to the point where it is unwilling to entertain any thought of compromise and negotiation.

Neutrality is also valued in South Vietnam for its own sake. After all, neutrality is not an exclusively Vietnamese phenomenon, but rather represents a widespread longing of countries everywhere to steer clear of power politics and war. The alternative to neutrality is membership in a bloc. But for small, weak countries newly emerged from colonialism, this bloc membership means not partnership between equals but dependency, and evokes the specter of colonialism.

Furthermore, a neutralist foreign policy represents the nation's best chance of survival, in the considered judgment of the leaders of many countries in Asia and Africa. Neutrality means offending neither side. Because little wars are safer than big ones, the great powers tend to work out their rivalry with each other via the small, weak countries which thus sink to being mere pawns. This is what neutrality tries to avoid.

The United States should understand this desire of new nations to avoid entangling alliances. When our country was young and weak we adopted this same foreign policy. But now our officials take the patronizing view that countries espousing neutrality are misguided and do not understand their true self-interest. By inference, only we know what is best for them. Despite U.S. pressures, most of the peoples of Southeast Asia have already adopted a neutral stance—Burma, Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia. Even Thailand (Siam) has a strong neutralist minority. Neutrality is in the Thai blood; Siam alone avoided becoming a colony in the 19th century, and achieved this feat by being a buffer between rival colonial powers, the French and the British.

GOVERNMENT FEARS NEUTRALISM

As the front has grown, so has the desire for neutrality, both within and outside the front. The sentiment for neutrality has been very strong in the Vietnamese exile community in Paris, a community small in numbers and representing the well-educated business and professional people who were able to escape from the Diem tyranny. The leaders in this community have had political careers in Vietnam. Some of these have

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formed the influential Committee for Peace and the Reconstruction of South Vietnam under Tran Van Huu, former Prime Minister in Bao Dai's regime. This committee is working for the neutralization of South Vietnam. The repression of free speech and the press was so great under Diem that this Vietnamese exile community in Paris represented about the only opposition voice of the Vietnamese people other than that of the front. While not all the Paris exiles are of one voice, a neutralist South Vietnam has become the dominant note.

After the coup d'état in the fall of 1963 the repression in South Vietnam lifted temporarily and new viewpoints were allowed expression. Leading Buddhists, especially those from Central Vietnam where Buddhism is strongest, spoke out in favor of neutralism. So did some representatives of the Cao Dai religious sect. A new newspaper appeared, advocating neutralism, and was quickly suppressed. Alarmed at the widespread growth of neutralist sentiment, General Khanh cracked down and on February 14, 1964, published a decree stating that anyone advocating neutralism would be subject to a military trial. The United States likewise grew jittery over the spreading enthusiasm for neutralism. We sent the armored missile cruiser, *Providence*, up the river to Saigon to quell the rising tide of neutralist feeling. As if this show of American force could undermine Saigon's longing for peace. Now, since the ruling dictator equates advocacy of neutralism with treason, neutralism again has no voice in Saigon. But it has many silent followers.

U.S. OPPOSES REUNIFICATION

Apparently the U.S. Government is opposed to the neutralization of South Vietnam for fear that it would soon lead to the peaceful unification of all Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. Some form of federation between North and South is likely to take place eventually, whatever our fears, and the issue will be decided by the Vietnamese people themselves, not by Americans. United States insistence on partition (we call it the sovereignty of South Vietnam) is viewed by many Vietnamese as a typical colonial tactic of divide and rule. Long before us the French had insisted on the partition of Vietnam into three zones. As a result, one of the slogans of the long struggle for independence from French imperialism was the reunification of Vietnam.

Both North and South Vietnam taken separately, as well as Vietnam taken as a whole, have suffered from the American policy of permanent partition, trade embargo between the two zones, and their perpetual confrontation. The two zones have been weakened, but in different ways. North Vietnam has stressed self-reliance and self-sufficiency—using the limited Communist bloc aid largely for industrial development—so it has had to tighten its belt and convert an undue proportion of resources to food production. South Vietnam, on the other hand, has chosen the path of increasing an already overwhelming dependence on the United States—some 75 percent of its annual budget is derived from American handouts. Foreign trade figures show this same total dependence on the United States. Year after year South Vietnam imports goods, mostly consumer goods, valued at 3 or 4 times the value of South Vietnam's exports. This may be good for American business, but it is bad for Vietnamese independence and economic development and has reduced South Vietnam to a nation of mendicants.

But it is idle and frivolous to compare and contrast North and South Vietnam. Americans committed to the policy of permanent dismemberment of Vietnam like to play this

game of pitting the North against the South from every vantage point, economic, social, and political. But to Vietnamese nationalists, whether they are conservative or radical, Vietnam should be one country, not two. It is just a question of how this reunification is going to be achieved—by peaceful negotiation or by war.

EVEN KHANH WANTS REUNIFICATION

The Front proposes the reunification of Vietnam by stages, beginning with the establishment of normal relations between the North and the South, that is, the resumption of trade and visiting back and forth. Later, after a coalition government has been set up representing all of South Vietnam, not just the military clique now controlling Saigon, negotiations can take place between the governments of the North and the South. The reunification could be worked out to the extent and at the pace that the South Vietnamese Government desires. Many Vietnamese not in the Front want to explore these proposals, since they represent what the great majority of the South Vietnamese people want, according to Le Quang, a leading spokesman for the large Cao Dai religious sect in South Vietnam (*La Tribune de Genève*, Dec. 27, 1962).

Even General Khanh is now proposing the reunification of Vietnam, not by peaceful negotiations but by force of American arms. His government-inspired demonstrations feature school children bearing aloft placards reading "We Want To March North." (*New York Times*, Mar. 13, 1964.) Any effort by the United States to extend the war by bombing or blockading North Vietnam would not reunify Vietnam but destroy it, and could unleash World War III.

WE NEED NEW VIETNAM POLICY

As Senate Majority Leader MIKE MANSFIELD has urged, the United States needs to reappraise its Vietnam policy. The world of 1964 has moved a long way from the world of 1954 when John Foster Dulles launched the futile and arrogant policy of treating South Vietnam as an outpost of the United States of America. Any new policy for Vietnam should help the Vietnamese to meet their own needs as they see them, instead of attempting to manipulate these long-suffering people for our purposes. Rather than opposing their deepest aspirations for a negotiated peace, let us work toward a conference between representatives of both sides to arrange a cease-fire.

Instead of opposing neutralism as a Communist plot, let us accept it as representing the longing of the Vietnamese people to live at peace with each other and with the outside world. Let us call an international conference of all the great powers and the countries in southeast Asia to explore the possibilities of Vietnamese neutralism and what contributions we and others can make, so that this neutralism can be as stable and viable as possible. To what acts of omission as well as commission could and should the great powers commit themselves to help Vietnam and other aspirants to neutralism attain their dream of nonalignment? Instead of trying to substitute ideological confrontation between Vietnamese factions for Vietnamese nationalism, let us accept the reality of Vietnamese nationalism and of its corollary, the reunification of Vietnam. Why not work with Vietnamese nationalism instead of against it?

Accepting Vietnamese nationalism means letting the Vietnamese decide on their own what kind of economic system they want and what type of relationship they want between North and South Vietnam. The famous domino theory, which regards the countries of southeast Asia not as independent entities but as faceless dominoes doomed to fall in unison if any one of them alters its position,

violates Vietnamese nationalism and the principle of self-determination. It says, in effect, the Vietnamese cannot decide what they want for themselves since whatever they do has repercussions elsewhere. (The assumption that Vietnam alone holds the dike for an anti-Communist southeast Asian bloc is of course a myth, since most of the countries of southeast Asia have already gone over to neutralism.) A policy of neutralism and the reunification of Vietnam should not be regarded by Americans as a defeat for America, but as a victory for the Vietnamese—since this is what they want.

President de Gaulle has done a great service in outlining the goals for a stable settlement—neutralization of southeast Asia, reunification of Vietnam, agreement of southeast Asian countries to respect one another's boundaries and consent of the great powers to respect the neutrality of the area. De Gaulle may also be able to help in working out the concrete means of achieving this goal. He can be a broker between the rival superpowers of China and the United States, as well as between hostile factions within Vietnam. France has great knowledge of the area and its people. France has an important stake in the area—substantial foreign investments, schools, and religious and cultural missions. The Vietnamese middle class speak French, not English, and value French culture and education. In France itself there are many influential Vietnamese who are identified neither with the front nor with the Government of South Vietnam.

LOOSE FEDERATION FAVORED

Two peaceful ways of reuniting Vietnam have been proposed so far. The Geneva Accords provided for an internationally supervised election. In 1962 a new proposal was made by the National Liberation Front and seconded by the Government of North Vietnam. This program recommends a conference between North and South Vietnamese governments. It gives South Vietnam equal weight with North Vietnam, even though South Vietnam's population is smaller. Reunification by a conference between the two Governments could result in a different kind of relationship between the North and South; namely, a loose federation as opposed to a unitary state which would result from overall elections. The conference plan appeals to many South Vietnamese middle class elements. A federation also appeals to many Vietnamese intellectuals, those in the Front as well as those outside it, who want South Vietnam to pave the way for parliamentary democracy in Vietnam.

Because this conference proposal presupposes that a new government will be set up in South Vietnam, a government which represents a united South Vietnam instead of one torn apart by civil war, it implies two stages for the fulfillment of any stable settlement. For this reason it evokes the ghosts of past failure. The Geneva Agreements also were supposed to be fulfilled in two stages, but the second stage, that of the elections, never took place. Anxiety over fulfillment of the second stage can be dispelled if this time the United States signs the agreement, American troops are withdrawn, and the coalition government set up in the South is one of broad representation. This is a difficult course. Is there any reason, however, to believe that it will become any less difficult the longer negotiations are postponed?

HO NEEDS A SETTLEMENT

As the civil war intensifies the peasants become more politically aroused—both by the Front's activities and by the war itself—the population of Saigon more war weary, the government soldiers more rebellious and Ho Chi Minh more uneasy. The strains of

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war decrease his ability to remain neutral between the U.S.S.R. and China. By stepping up the war in South Vietnam and threatening to expand it to North Vietnam, the United States is doing its utmost to push North Vietnam into increasing reliance on the power of China. Then we turn around and accuse North Vietnam of veering toward China.

An end of the war and restoration of trade between North and South Vietnam would not only enable South Vietnam to live, but would give Ho some ability to maneuver in his delicate and skillful game of balancing Russian and Chinese aid and influence, thereby maintaining Vietnam's independence. When Ho's relations with the West are resumed, he will be even better placed to build and strengthen the true independence of Vietnam so that it may evolve toward political nonalignment. In this connection, it may be recalled that Vietnamese Communists are strong nationalists. Like the Yugoslavs, they made their revolution on their own initiative and by their own efforts.

THE WAR MUST STOP

Whatever the outcome of negotiations, the killing in Vietnam must stop. By interfering on the losing side, our country has doomed Vietnam to a continuing civil war which would have been over long ago save for our massive transfusions of money, material, and men, to the faltering governments of South Vietnam. The terrible suffering of this dirty war is on our conscience. All the homeless, all the orphans, all the widows, all the tortures by the Government's soldiers to extract information and by the guerrillas to punish the informers, all the excruciating pain of burning human flesh from napalm bombs, all the thousands of Vietnamese dead, whichever side they were fighting for—all these horrors are being multiplied by the Johnson administration's insistence that the war must go on.

And the American dead. As this is written, the latest figures are 31 killed in the first 103 days of 1964. Americans killed, wounded, and missing since January 1, 1963, totaled 812. (Jacques Nevard in the New York Times, Apr. 14, 1964.)

Not a single additional American boy should die in this dirty, undeclared war that violates America's own highest ideals, the United Nations Charter and the basic rights of peoples everywhere to self-determination.

As Senator GRUENING declares, "Let us get out of Vietnam on as good terms as possible—but let us get out."

Senator GRUENING has declared, "Let us get out of Vietnam on as good terms as possible—but let us get out." If you agree with the Senator, write President Johnson, your Senators and Congressman and your local newspapers, asking that an international conference be called to work out a genuine peace settlement for Vietnam and her immediate neighbors and that American troops be withdrawn from Vietnam.

KHRUSHCHEV'S LITTLE JOKE

During the delivery of Mr. McCLELLAN's speech,

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in hailing Nasser as a great leader, Khrushchev, during his present visit to Egypt, said:

We fight together for the complete eradication of imperialism.

The old boy has a sense of humor. For the one great imperialism in the world today remaining intact, monolithic, and ruthless, is that directed by Boss Khrushchev from the Kremlin in Moscow. It has enslaved the people of the Ukraine,

of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary.

We can well remember of helpful Russia's boss when the Hungarians, in the fall of 1956, sought to eradicate Moscow's imperialism. They were mowed down by Khrushchev's tanks and machineguns.

If there is another imperialism in the making, it is one that Gamal Abdel Nasser would like to be boss of, stretching from the Atlantic across northern Africa and southern Asia to the Persian Gulf.

I ask unanimous consent that the news article from the New York Times of May 11, entitled "Khrushchev Hails Nasser As Leader," be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

KHRUSHCHEV HAILS NASSER AS LEADER—RALLY OF 100,000 IN CAIRO CHEERS SOVIET PREMIER

(By Jay Walz)

CAIRO, May 10.—Premier Khrushchev congratulated Egyptian youth tonight on following the Arab Socialist leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

He said the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union were progressing along parallel lines.

"We fight together for the complete eradication of imperialism," the Soviet Premier declared.

Mr. Khrushchev addressed a rally of more than 100,000 people in a new Cairo stadium. He was introduced by Mr. Nasser "as a man who has stood by our side."

Mr. Khrushchev told his young audience: "Our country was the first to follow the path of Socialism under the Communist leadership of Lenin. Our country built a Socialist society."

"When we started our reforms there were those who tried to convince the people that ours was an impossible mission. But now we are an example of constructive welfare and culture."

In his 45-minute address Mr. Khrushchev emphasized the distinction between communism and Socialism, but repeated the theme he has stressed since his arrival in Egypt yesterday: that "peace-loving people" must live together regardless of their different political systems.

"The liberation movement will gain strength," he declared, "but there is a big fight ahead. We must join efforts to achieve our objectives."

Mr. Khrushchev spoke in Russian and his remarks were translated paragraph by paragraph into Arabic. The crowd cheered him without waiting for translations.

The Soviet Premier said Egypt was making "rapid strides to social progress."

Mr. Khrushchev told the youths that the younger generation in Egypt enjoyed the benefits of the success of President Nasser, whom he hailed as a "great leader" of the liberation movement.

"You may now apply your talents not for the benefit of foreigners but for the good of your people," he declared.

Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Nasser had the first of three scheduled official talks this afternoon at Kubbeth Palace. Aids said the conversations could be informal, following no set agenda, with the two leaders exchanging views "frankly and freely" on world problems and tensions, as well as on matters of immediate concern to their countries.

In public remarks since his arrival yesterday, Mr. Khrushchev has said more about signs of peace than about tensions. In an after-dinner speech last night in Abdin Palace the Premier pointed to "certain relaxa-

tions of international tensions" resulting from the "elimination of the Caribbean crisis," the limited ban on nuclear tests and agreement of the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain to reduce production of fissionable materials.

Mr. Khrushchev took his family on a typical sightseers' tour of Cairo museums today.

Accompanied by President and Mrs. Nasser, the Khrushchevs heard guides narrate the story of Egypt's 5,000-year history, dramatized by Pharaonic and other relics, including the famous collection of pieces from Tutankhamen's tomb.

AIR SAFETY

During the delivery of Mr. McCLELLAN's speech,

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, I share the widespread concern that maximum safety precautions be taken with regard to air travel, and for that reason I call attention to the consideration now being given to installation of runway arresting gear at commercial airports.

The principle of stopping planes quickly by means of a cable has long been used. Aircraft carriers, for example, stop fighter planes this way.

The arresting gear concept has, in recent years, been installed at many Air Force and Navy landing bases as well.

As yet this idea has not been adopted for commercial airfields, although in 1958 the Federal Aviation Agency began a program to test and demonstrate the feasibility of using runway arresting gear. The All American Engineering Co., Wilmington, Del., was the FAA contractor for this work, and much of the testing was done at All American facilities in Georgetown, Del.

On May 7, the Wall Street Journal carried an article which sums up the current situation very well in regard to runway arresting gear, and because the problem of air safety is such an important one, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AIRLINE INDUSTRY MAY INSTALL ARRESTING GEAR TO AVERT ACCIDENTS—SYSTEM PREVENTS 300 CRASHES AT MILITARY FIELDS BUT COST COULD DETER COMMERCIAL USE

(By Richard P. Cooke)

As an Air Force jet hurtled toward a landing at Bentwaters Airfield north of London recently, the pilot suddenly realized he was in trouble. One wheel had locked in a down position and the other remained stuck inside the wing.

One-wheel landings in fast jets often have ended in fatal accidents. But, in this case, the F-101 fighter touched down smoothly on a single wheel at 160 miles an hour, and a hook under the fuselage almost immediately caught a cable stretched across the runway. The cable mechanism slowed the plane so quickly it remained upright until it stopped; then it dipped to one side, damaging the wingtip slightly but leaving the pilot unhurt.

Such dramatic accident prevention, now becoming routine at military fields, may also be commonplace someday soon at commercial airports. The Federal Aviation Agency today is convening a meeting in Washington of commercial airline officials, airport operators, builders of jet airlines and people who oversee flight safety. Their goal: To explore